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Government Ownership and Risk Taking among European Savings 
Banks 
 
Abstract 
This study aims to investigate whether government ownership of savings banks in Europe 
has a significant effect on their risk-taking behaviour. The study employs time-varying Z-
score to measure risk using yearly accounting and ownership data of 721 savings banks from 
seven European countries over a period of 16 years from 2000 to 2015, covering the period 
before, during, and after the global financial crisis. The empirical estimates suggest an 
overall positive relationship between fully and partly government-owned savings banks and 
their respective Z-scores. Whereas the same positive relationship was found for the periods 
before and after the crisis, it could not be confirmed for the crisis period from 2008 to 2010, 
indicating that financial shocks render government ownership insignificant in explaining the 
risk behaviour of savings banks. On a country-level analysis, a positive relationship was 
obtained for France and Sweden, whereas ownership was not significant for the individual 
samples of the remaining countries. Overall, government ownership is not associated with 
an increase in savings banks’ risk of default for the crisis period, which therefore contradicts 
the call for more privatisation within the European banking market. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between ownership structure and risk-taking behaviour of banks is one of 
the fundamental research questions within the topic of banking, as evident from the number 
of studies published over the last decades. By following this trend, this study investigates 
whether different types of ownership have a significant effect on savings banks’ risk-taking 
behaviour in various European countries, and if so, in which ways this effect is expressed. 
In general, banks are mutually, privately, or publicly owned. For the latter type, authors such 
as Ianotta et al. (2013) have found increased risk-taking behaviour compared to private 
banks as a consequence of the enjoyed governmental protectionism in the form of 
guarantees, which are said to reduce default risk and create negative incentives. However, a 
broad picture of the after-crisis integrated European savings banks market as well as a 
breakdown that allows for a standardised comparison of the influence of ownership in the 
different countries is yet to be drawn. An understanding of the magnitude of such risk 
exposure is very important, as state-owned banks hold approximately 21 per cent of the 
overall banking industry’s assets, as shown by Gonzalez-Garcia and Grigoli (2013), who 
investigated 94 countries, including the major European banking markets in the United 
Kingdom and Germany. 
 
Within the European Monetary Union, savings banks are of particular interest, as their 
structures, as well as their ability to absorb systemic shocks, seem to differ fundamentally. 
This especially became evident over the course of the financial crisis during the years 2008 
to 2010 when many banks, including savings banks in Italy, Spain, France, and other 
European countries, were in need of governmental capital injections in order to continue 
their operations. In contrast, all of the German Sparkassen, as public institutions, have coped 
comparably well with the financial crisis and have remained in the hands of the public, 
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whereas the Spanish cajas de ahorros were also governmentally influenced but were largely 
taken over and restructured to become corporations as a result of an immense risk exposure 
in real estate markets (Cardenas, 2013). Hence, ownership structure may explain risk-taking 
behaviour of publicly owned institutions if the banking sector is examined as a whole, but 
this may not necessarily explain the behaviour of individual types of publicly owned banks, 
which, in the case of savings banks, seem to require a more differentiated analysis.  
 
This study aims to examine and compare the impact of different ownership types on the 
European savings banks’ risk-taking behaviour. This will be measured through a time-
varying Z-score, a variable that has gained popularity in the analysis of panel data over the 
last few years, as it measures the distance to insolvency of individual banks on a rolling 
basis. The study aims to investigate the risk-taking development of European savings banks 
from the beginning of the millennium until 2015, encompassing the periods before, during, 
and after the financial crisis. 
 
The empirical estimates suggest a positive relationship between fully as well as partly 
government-owned savings banks and their respective Z-scores in the entire sample period. 
The whole sample was analysed subsequently over three different time frames to capture 
possible effects of the financial crisis. Whereas the same positive relationship was found for 
the periods before and after the crisis, it could not be confirmed for the crisis period from 
2008 to 2010, indicating that financial shocks render government ownership insignificant in 
explaining the risk behaviour of savings banks. On a country level, a positive relationship 
was obtained for France and Sweden, whereas ownership was not significant for the 
remaining countries. Instead, bank profitability and size were relevant in explaining the Z-
score in Germany and Norway, respectively. Overall, government ownership is not 
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associated with an increase in savings banks’ risk of default, thus questioning the call for 
more privatisation within the European banking market. 
 
The rest of this study is divided into six sections. Section 2 is devoted to a literature review, 
which introduces the most relevant research on government ownership and risk taking in the 
banking industry. In Section 3, the specific methodology employed to answer the research 
questions is presented and discussed. Section 4 describes the data requirements and sources, 
whereas Section 5 deals with an in-depth analysis of the regression estimates for the overall 
sample, different time frames (pre-, mid-, and post-financial crisis), and an analysis of the 
individual European countries. Section 6 contains the conclusions of the study. 
 
2. Review of the literature 
The question as to whether different types of ownership influence a bank’s risk taking has 
evolved out of moral hazard and incentive problems arising due to the separation of 
ownership and control. Berle and Means (1968) and later Jensen and Meckling (1976) 
recognised that dispersion of ownership can lead to a conflict of objectives. As management 
equity holdings decrease, they require reduced effort. However, as shareholder 
concentration increases, increased monitoring activities will decrease discretionary power 
of management and increase shareholder value. Due to the positive relation between risk 
and return, this implies riskier investments. This relationship has been empirically found to 
be significant (Demsetz et al., 1997; Saunders et al., 1990) without definite agreement about 
the direction.  
 
Agusman et al. (2014) found that, while overall risk did not generally correlate with 
shareholder concentration, it did so for banks whose government participation increased 
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through recapitalisation. Thus, a bank’s risk profile may differ depending on whether a 
majority is held by the public or by private investors. This idea has been subject to numerous 
studies, evolving around two major perspectives. The first perspective is known as the 
development view, mainly credited to Gerschenkron (1962), who argued that government 
participation in the banking industry could be favourable when capital is scarce in order to 
promote economic growth in the presence of market failures (Gonzalez-Garcia & Grigoli, 
2013) or emerging economies (Ianotta et al., 2013). Amongst others, Stiglitz (1993) states 
that certain market failures justify government intervention. 
 
A contrasting perspective is the political view, which argues that governments acquire banks 
as a measure of providing employment or other benefits that assure the government 
sustained political influence, hence causing inefficiencies. This sceptical view is supported 
by evidence of inefficient government-owned enterprises (La Porta & Lopez-de-Silanes, 
1999) and has led to the introduction of economic models supporting the privatisation and 
restructuring of public banks (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In a cross-country study, LaPorta 
et al. (2002) empirically concluded that government ownership leads to inefficiencies and 
therefore reduced economic growth in underdeveloped economies with weak property 
rights. These findings were referred to by Dinç (2005), who put emphasis on the relation 
between government-owned banks’ (GOBs) lending behaviour and election years. He 
concluded that politicians in emerging economies use their power to increase lending during 
election years. 
 
Pennathur et al. (2012) analysed the impact of the ownership nature on income 
diversification and risk of Indian banks. They found that public-sector banks show fewer 
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diversified income sources and rely more heavily on traditional loans, increasing overall 
risk. However, their study failed to control for other factors. 
 
García-Marco and Robles-Fernández (2008) analysed the Spanish banking market using the 
Z-score as a measure of risk. While commercial banks represent private entities, savings 
banks represent a fairly unique case, as they are controlled by a large number of 
stakeholders, mostly public administrations, as well as private investors and firms, making 
them entities under private and public control. In contrast to Pennathur et al. (2012), they 
analysed whether differences in risk profiles could also be due to other explanatory 
variables, such as size. Their results found that size and ownership are significant in 
explaining risk profiles. While smaller private and public banks presented a lower risk 
profile, commercial banks were generally more risk-inclined than savings banks (García- 
García-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008). These findings were confirmed by Beck et al. 
(2009) for Germany. 
 
An earlier study by Fernandez et al. (2006) analysed the impact of savings banks’ transition 
from private to public institutions through the LORCA1 law, employing a natural 
experiment. They concluded that an increase in government participation also led to an 
increase in the savings banks’ risk, but not to an improvement in performance (Fernandez 
et al., 2006). 
                                                     
1 Ley de regulación de normas básicas sobre órganos rectores de las cajas de ahorros: A 1985 banking law that 
introduced the percentage representation of public administration, depositors, and employees in the ownership 
structure and settled the legal and organisational framework of Spanish savings banks in a way that regional 
and local governments were able to own as much as 51 per cent of a branch, which ultimately classified these 
as public institutions. 
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Recently, Ianotta et al. (2013) included electoral cycle data to analyse whether political 
factors influence the risk-taking behaviour of government-owned banks. Their results 
showed that government-owned banks exhibit comparatively lower default risk but higher 
operational risk that rises during the years following elections. Hence, as lower default risk 
is not explained by superior economic situations, the authors argue it must be due to the 
government protection that the public banks enjoy, which increase risk-taking incentives 
(Ianotta et al., 2013). 
 
Government protection exists in the form of deposit insurance, said to create moral hazard 
problems through decreased market discipline (Ianotta et al., 2013). Since Merton (1977) 
recognised the cost of deposit insurance and guarantees, a parallel strand of literature focuses 
on the impact of implicit and explicit guarantees on the risk taking of banks (Keeley, 1990; 
Cordella & Yeyati, 2003; Hakenes & Schnabel, 2010). Gropp et al. (2010) conducted a 
natural experiment on the discontinuation of government guarantees of German savings 
banks. Their results showed that banks reduced their credit risk and shifted their funds away 
from interest-sensitive debt (Gropp et al., 2010).  
 
However, none of the studies mentioned above have analysed the significance of ownership 
structure on bank risk on a comparative basis for European savings banks covering the 
period of restructuring during the financial crisis of 2008. Hence, this study fills this gap in 
the literature by investigating savings banks in seven major European countries in terms of 
their risk-taking behaviour and the role played by government ownership in 
increasing/decreasing the appetite for risk.  
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3. Methodology 
This study adds to and extends the existing literature in two ways. First, it covered a time 
frame (2000 to 2015) that, to the best of the author’s knowledge, has not been investigated 
before. Second, by focussing on European savings banks, it became possible to analyse and 
compare, in terms of ownership structure, a single institutional type that has undergone 
changes in numerous countries within the observed period. 
 
A panel data pooled regression was conducted in order to test for the effects of ownership 
structure on savings banks’ risk over time. The three regression models were evaluated to 
follow the assumptions of the classical linear regression model (CLRM) in order to draw 
correct inferences about the variables’ coefficients. These tests were conducted for the whole 
sample of savings banks as well as for the individual countries. The three main assumptions 
are that the residuals have a mean of zero (𝐸(𝑢𝑡) = 0), that the variance of the residuals is 
constant and smaller than infinity (𝑣𝑎𝑟(𝑢𝑡) = 𝜎
2 <  ∞), and that the residuals are not 
correlated over time (𝑐𝑜𝑣(𝑢𝑖 , 𝑢𝑗) = 0 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 ≠ 𝑗) (Brooks, 2014, p. 129). Whereas the first 
condition is always fulfilled as long as a constant is included in the regression (Brooks, 2014, 
p. 131), the latter two assumptions needed to be tested. This was done through employing a 
Durbin-Watson (DW) test that detects autocorrelation between the residuals, as well as a 
Breusch-Pagan (BP) test searching for heteroscedasticity (non-constant variance) within the 
error terms. If the assumptions are fulfilled, the OLS method gives the best linear unbiased 
estimators (BLUE). If the two conditions are not fulfilled, the estimators are still unbiased, 
but they are no longer the best choice available, as they do not yield the minimum variance 
property among the class of unbiased estimators (Brooks, 2014, p. 135). If this is the case, 
other estimation methods, such as the Newey-West estimator, need to be taken into 
consideration.  
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The next step was to identify a variable that accurately measures the default risk of a bank. 
For major banks, issuer and individual credit ratings, as used by Ianotta et al. (2013), were 
a reliable proxy for a bank’s default risk, as they combine several informative variables, 
such as asset quality and profitability, into one comprehensive measure. However, as the 
commonly smaller and regionally operating savings banks are the subject of this study, 
credit ratings were largely unavailable. An equally meaningful alternative variable to 
measure default risk is the Z-score. Originally, the Z-score was created by Altman (1968), 
who employed a multiple discriminant analysis to identify a set of five accounting ratios, 
which, when combined into a single ratio (Z-score), ought to be able to separate healthy 
companies from those that will file for bankruptcy. He selected a sample of 66 listed 
manufacturing companies, 33 of which had filed for bankruptcy during the period from 1946 
to 1965. Indeed, his model was significant in predicting the solvency of the firms: it 
estimated the correct outcome for 94 per cent of the selected sample. In future academic 
papers, Altman developed multiple variations of his model that were designed to render it 
applicable to non-manufacturing and service companies (Vaziri et al., 2012, p. 123). 
However, none of these are commonly used for financial institutions. In the late 20th century, 
multiple scholars (see Boyd & Graham, 1986 and Hannan & Hanweck, 1988) developed 
advanced Z-score models, which were designed for analysing the probability of insolvency 
of financial institutions, thereby filling this gap in the previous literature. These Z-scores are 
derived as follows: in the banking literature, a state of insolvency occurs when losses (−𝜋) 
surmount equity (𝐸): 
 
(1)      𝐸 < −𝜋  
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This is equal to writing: 
 
(2)      𝐸 +  𝜋 < 0 
 
By dividing both sides by the institution’s assets (𝐴), the inequality transforms to: 
 
(3)      
𝐸
𝐴
+
𝜋
𝐴
< 0 
 
Hence, the insolvency state is expressed in percentage values rather than absolute values, 
which has the benefit that this can be compared between institutions of different sizes. By 
substituting the capital asset ratio (𝐶𝐴𝑅) for 
𝐸
𝐴
 and the return on assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) for 
𝜋
𝐴
, the 
inequality can be written as: 
 
(4)      𝐶𝐴𝑅 + 𝑅𝑂𝐴 < 0 
 
It can be shown that, when ROA is a random variable with mean 𝜇𝑟𝑜𝑎 and variance 𝜎𝑟𝑜𝑎
2 , 
the upper bound of the probability of insolvency according to the Bienaymé–Chebyshev 
inequality can be written as (Boyd & Graham, 1986, p. 48): 
 
(5)     𝑝(𝑅𝑂𝐴 ≤ 𝐶𝐴𝑅) ≤ [
(𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐴+𝐶𝐴𝑅)
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
]
−2
= 𝑍−2, 
 
in which Z represents the Z-score and is identical to: 
 
(6)      𝑍 ≡
(𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐴+𝐶𝐴𝑅)
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴
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The Z-score is expressed in standard deviations. Hence, it expresses by how many standard 
deviations profits can fall below the mean in order for the equity to become negative and 
cause bankruptcy of the respective institution (Boyd & Graham, 1986, p. 48). As can be 
identified in inequality (5), the Z-score is inversely related to the probability of insolvency, 
meaning that when Z rises, the probability of insolvency falls, indicating that this institution 
has become more stable, and vice versa (Köhler, 2012). For this reason, the Z-score is also 
said to indicate the distance from insolvency. The described Z-score is mostly used for 
analysing cross-sectional data. For panel data, a variation called the time-varying Z-score 
has been put forward in the literature (Lepetit & Strobel, 2013). Because this dissertation 
analysed an unstructured panel of data, the latter variation of the Z-score was therefore 
relevant for this study and has been applied to the data sample. It differs from that for cross-
sectional data (equation (6) only in that the three variables need to be calculated on a rolling 
basis for the respective time periods: 
 
(7)     𝑍 ≡
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡+ 𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
𝜎𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡
> 0, 
 
where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the capital asset ratio of institution 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡 is the return on 
assets of the respective firm 𝑖 at time 𝑡 (Lepetit & Strobel, 2013, p. 74). The expected value 
of the ROA (µ) and the standard deviation (𝜎) at time 𝑡 were calculated on a rolling basis 
with a window width of 𝑛 = 3. The window width determines how many values form the 
basis for the underlying variable. The calculated value was assigned to the most recent year 
in the time window. As an example, the expected value (µ) of ROA for the year 2002 was 
based on the values from 2000 to 2002. Consequently, the years 2000 and 2001 did not 
exhibit any values, which in this case was negligible due to a general lack of reported data 
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for many institutions during this time period. Additionally, this calculation method yields 
the advantage that the variables for the respective years are based on past data rather than 
predicted future values, improving the validity of the model. 
 
 The Z-score, as the endogenous variable of the regression, was calculated in three different 
variations. The variable 𝑅𝑂𝐴 was represented by the return on average assets (ROAA) in all 
three variations. This is the return on the mean assets a bank held over the course of a year 
and is thus representative for the entire year, rather than only the balance sheet key date. 
However, the variable 𝐶𝐴𝑅 was measured through three different variables: the Tier 1 ratio, 
the total capital ratio, and the ratio of equity to total assets. Whereas the latter is the original 
definition of 𝐶𝐴𝑅, the Tier 1 ratio differs in that it is calculated by dividing a bank’s core 
capital (Tier 1 capital) by its risk-weighted assets. This adjusted ratio is a commonly used 
measure for assessing a bank’s capital strength and therefore has a higher validity than the 
𝐶𝐴𝑅 when calculating the Z-score. However, it suffers from the limitation that it is available 
for very few bank-year combinations. Hence, 𝐶𝐴𝑅 is additionally represented by the total 
capital ratio, as well as by the ratio of equity to total assets, in order to gain further 
informational content and to check for the robustness of the results when different Z-score 
measures are employed. 
 
Ownership structure was measured by employing a dummy variable that took on the value 
of 1 if a government held stakes exceeding 50 per cent of a saving’s bank and 0 otherwise. 
In consideration of the case that a bank was partially owned by its respective country’s 
government, another dummy variable was employed that took on the value of 1 if the share 
was above 0 per cent but below 50 per cent, and 0 otherwise. Additional variables were 
included in the regression because there are, as a matter of course, factors other than 
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ownership that influence the risk profile of a bank. It was hypothesised that bank size and 
profitability are also significant in predicting the riskiness of a savings bank. Size of the 
bank was included in the regression expressed through the logarithmised value of total 
assets. This is justified by the idea that larger banks tend to have better access to funds and 
may also enjoy cost efficiency that can boost return on assets (McAllister & McManus, 
1993), which in return influences the Z-score. This variable was transformed logarithmically 
in order to be able to interpret the coefficients as proportional differences, making them 
semi-elasticities. Profitability was measured through return on equity (ROE), which, 
according to general portfolio theory, was expected to show a positive relationship with 
overall risk (García-Marco and Robles-Fernández, 2008, p. 338). ROE was not transformed, 
as it already is a relative measure. 
 
The GDP growth rate, the consumer price index (CPI), the unemployment rate, and the 
central bank base rate of the bank’s respective country were included as control variables to 
filter for macroeconomic effects. Whereas the first three are commonly included in 
regressions, the central bank rate offers particular importance when analysing banks or 
savings banks. Generally, there are two ways in which interest rate changes can affect a 
bank’s risk-taking behaviour. The first is called the substitution effect, which states that 
higher funding costs for banks increase the price of debt-financing instruments, therefore 
leading banks to decrease their leverage and substitute debt with equity. The other, 
contradictory, effect states that higher relative funding costs decrease bank profitability and 
therefore give them an incentive to take on additional risk (Agur & Demertzis, 2012, p. 3). 
It is therefore interesting to see which effect has the stronger weighting. 
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The three different variations of the Z-score were regressed individually against the above-
mentioned variables for each of the seven countries over the full observation period. 
Furthermore, one regression was conducted that included the full sample of European 
savings banks. As an analysis of all three versions of the Z-score for each country would 
surpass the scope of this dissertation, one has been chosen to stand representatively for the 
further analysis of the corresponding country. The decision criterion was based on whether 
there are sufficient values available for the calculation, as well as the informational value of 
the variable. If all three outputs give qualitatively similar results concerning the significance 
of the coefficients and the sign of the estimates, the Tier 1-based Z-score variable will always 
be favoured, as it provides superior informational value and leads to more realistic estimates. 
 
These approaches were undertaken in order to analyse country-specific attributes and to give 
a general survey of the savings banks’ situation in Europe. Subsequently, the overall sample 
was split up in three different time frames: one pre-crisis period from 2000 to 2007, one 
crisis period from 2008 to 2010, and one post-crisis period from 2011 to 2015. The proxy 
for the start of the crisis period was the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 
2008. The cut-off point was determined in 2010, when the liquidity problems from banks 
spread to sovereign governments (Elliot, 2011). Hence, the author recognises that savings 
banks in Europe were still influenced by the European sovereign debt crisis during the latter 
period (Popov & Van Horen, 2014). A special emphasis was put on the interpretation of the 
ownership dummy variable coefficient. In accordance with economic theory, a positive 
coefficient would imply that fully or partly government-owned savings banks (dummy 
variable equal to 1) tend to have higher Z-scores than privately owned institutions, placing 
them further away from insolvency. In contrast, a negative coefficient would denote the 
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inverse relationship, whereas a coefficient not significantly different from zero would imply 
no relationship at all. 
 
4. Data description 
The financial and ownership data for the savings banks over the chosen time interval were 
extracted from BvD (Bureau van Dijk) Bankscope. The Bloomberg database was used to 
access macroeconomic data of the respective countries. The data sources can be found in 
more detail in Table 1. 
 
[Insert table 1 about here] 
In a first step, the countries of the European Union had to be screened manually due to three 
reasons. First, savings banks, defined as focussing on savings mobilisation and having a 
clear regional focus, (Bülbül et al., 2013, p. 2) do not exist in every country of the European 
Union (e.g., Great Britain). Second, Bankscope did not collect sufficient data for the 
required variables during the analysed period (2000 to 2015) for some countries. Hence, 
countries that have only five or fewer banks were eliminated from the search strategy. Third, 
Bankscope disclosed some weaknesses concerning its ability to correctly categorise 
different types of banks: when filtering for savings banks, it also includes Volksbanken and 
Raiffeisenbanken in Germany in the saving banks category; these do have an explicit 
regional focus but could be better categorised as cooperative banks (Altunbas, Evans, & 
Molyneux, 2001, p. 939).  
 
As a result of the screening mentioned above, seven member countries of the European 
Union, namely Austria, Finland, France, Germany, Norway, Spain, and Sweden, remained 
in the sample, totalling 721 savings banks. For each of these, two different types of data sets 
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were created. The first set produced all of the employed variables for every year for each 
bank, while the second included the information on bank ownership necessary in order to 
classify whether the savings banks are publicly, collectively, or privately owned. 
 
To draw a broad picture of the ownership situation and also to fill missing gaps, the BvD 
independence indicator, as well as the shareholder names, the number of the respective 
shareholders, and information on domestic and ultimate ownership were included in the 
search strategy. The BvD independence indicator is a useful tool, as it simplifies the question 
of ownership by labelling each bank with a letter ranging from A to D and therefore 
subdividing them into different classes, depending on the degree of ownership. If no 
ownership data are available, the individual bank is labelled with a U. Table 2 presents the 
detailed classification given by BvD. 
 
[Insert table 2 about here] 
 
Using the data on ownership, each bank was examined individually to assign the appropriate 
category. In cases where the BvD independence indicator and the shareholder information 
did not provide sufficient information, specific information provided by the respective 
institution was used in order to identify the ownership structure. 
 
Macroeconomic data (CPI, GDP growth rates, unemployment rates, and central bank rates) 
for the respective years were obtained from the Bloomberg database. Macroeconomic 
variables are included in the regression in order to control for country-specific effects, such 
as economic growth or recessions in the respective countries, and general macroeconomic 
development, which might foster developments concerning the risk-taking behaviour of 
savings banks independently from the main variables, such as ownership, size, and 
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profitability. Inflation has been argued to be negatively correlated with bank stability (Altig 
& Nosal, 2009, p. 281). It is therefore important to include these data so as to not 
overestimate the regression coefficients because of a co-movement between the endogenous 
and exogenous variables that is due to outside, uncontrolled-for factors. 
 
5. Empirical results 
The estimation of regression was performed in two steps. First, we tested for autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity and chose the final appropriate estimation strategy accordingly. 
Second, the estimated coefficients for the three alternative Z-scores (the ratio of equity to 
total assets, total capital ratio, Tier 1) were presented, tested for significance levels, and then 
interpreted. We repeated this exercise for the entire sample, sub-periods, and individual 
countries accordingly. In accordance with the methodology, the three regression models 
with the respectively different versions of the Z-score considering the whole sample of 7692 
bank-year observations were tested for autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity, as these two 
are often present in panel data residuals (Pisa, 2008, p. 79).  
 
Autocorrelation was tested through employing a DW test that checks for first-order 
autocorrelation between an error and its previous lagged value (Brooks, 2014, p. 144). The 
result showed that the null hypothesis of no autocorrelation was rejected at the 1% level of 
significance, therefore resulting in serial autocorrelation of at least order one. These results 
were robust for all three regression systems. Heteroscedasticity was tested for by employing 
a BP test. The result showed that the null hypothesis of homoscedastic errors was rejected 
at the 1% level of significance. These results were robust over the three different regression 
systems. The summarised results of the tests are presented in Table 3. 
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There are multiple solutions to dealing with heteroscedasticity or autocorrelation separately, 
such as taking first differences for first-order autocorrelation or using a generalised least 
squares (GLS) method to eliminate heteroscedastic error terms (Brooks, 2014). However, 
when both are present in panel data, a common approach is to use heteroscedastic and 
autocorrelation consistent (HAC) standard errors (SE) as first introduced by Newey and 
West (1987). This estimation method has the advantage that it implicitly assumes the 
infringement of the CLRM assumptions, which improves the SE of the regression and 
therefore the validity of the coefficients. Moreover, it avoids choosing a lag length, as ‘the 
maximum lag length is one less the maximum number of years per firm’ (Petersen, 2008). 
It also has the advantage that it is especially effective for larger samples, such as the one at 
hand (Bertrand et al., 2004). In order to scale the regression variables to similar sizes and 
avoid high coefficient estimates and standard errors, the dependent variables (the Z-scores 
based on the ratio of equity to total assets, total capital ratio, Tier 1), which are relatively 
large in value compared to the independent variables, were standardised (Albright et al., 
2008). 
 
[Insert table 3 about here] 
 
 
Table 4 shows the coefficient estimates, as well as the corresponding standard errors, t-
statistics, and significance levels, for the dependent Z-score (Tier 1). By looking at these 
estimates, it becomes evident that both government variables are highly significant. When 
looking at the respective coefficient estimate signs, it can be seen that there is a clear positive 
relationship between the ownership structure of European savings banks and their risk-
taking behaviour. Hence, when a savings bank is fully (government ownership > 50%) or 
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partly (government ownership < 50%) government-owned, the Z-score is expected to 
increase, which therefore augments the distance to insolvency.  
 
This supports the findings of Gropp et al. (2011), who concluded that government protection 
is either insignificant or shows a decreasing effect on banks’ risk taking for their respective 
sample, contradicting the conventional argument that government protection is associated 
with higher risk taking. Interestingly, this relationship seems to be independent of the size 
of the institution, as the logarithm of total assets as a proxy for the institution’s size is not 
significant at any conventional level. However, in accordance with García-Marco and 
Robles-Fernández (2008), profitability of a savings bank, measured through the return on 
average equity (ROAE), is significant in explaining the variation of the Z-score at the 5% 
level. It has a negative coefficient, implying that, as savings banks become more profitable 
and increase their equity returns, their Z-score decreases, implying that they have invested 
in riskier assets. The result stands in accordance with portfolio theory arguing that higher 
risk must be compensated with higher returns. 
 
[Insert table 4 about here] 
 
Concerning the control variables, GDP growth, as well as unemployment and the central 
bank rate, are significant at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level of significance, respectively, whereas 
inflation measured through the CPI does not contribute to the explanation of the Z-score. 
The central bank rate coefficient is negative, stating that rising interest rates for European 
savings banks led to a lower Z-score and therefore riskier behaviour. Consequently, the 
substitution effect as elaborated by Agur and Demertzis (2012) seems to have a weaker 
effect on European savings banks than the risk-taking incentive. 
 
21 
 
Table 5 presents the same output, but for the Z-score calculated with the total capital ratio 
and the ratio of equity to total assets. The results are similar to those found in Table 4, as 
both government variables, as well as ROAE as a measure of profitability, are significant. 
Differences include that the logarithm of total assets as a measure for size and inflation as a 
control variable are significant in the regression, for which the Z-score was calculated 
employing the ratio of equity to total assets. The coefficient estimate of the logarithm of 
total assets has a negative sign, therefore supporting the theory of McAllister and McManus 
(1993) that larger banks have better access to funds and invest in riskier investments that 
can boost returns. 
 
In contrast, the inflation rate coefficient has a positive sign, contradicting Altig and Nosal 
(2009), who found that rising inflation is expected to decrease bank stability. This could be 
due to the fact that, especially in the later time frame of the sample period, numerous 
European states had to deal with deflation, a situation in which a slight inflation would have 
added to the stability of the banking system. The only difference of the total capital ratio 
regression is that GDP growth rate is not significant as a control variable. 
 
[Insert table 5 about here] 
 
Time frame analysis for the whole sample and country-level analysis 
As the results do not significantly differ across the three alternative variations, two of the Z-
score variations were dropped for the subsequent analysis, and the regression coefficients 
test based on the Tier 1 ratio was chosen as a preferred model. We divided the overall sample 
period into three sub-samples and again tested for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity to 
determine whether the Newey-West estimation method had to be applied. Based on these 
tests, the regressions, as found in Table 6, were performed. 
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It can be noticed that both government ownership variables show a positive coefficient and 
are significant at the 5% level for the first and last period but become insignificant for the 
financial crisis period. The financial crisis period thus contradicts the previous findings. Not 
only the government ownership variable, but all other variables fail to explain the 
development of the Z-score during these three years. Hence, it seems that the financial 
shocks that European savings banks had to suffer cannot be expressed through simple 
accounting ratios. Additionally, the insignificance of government ownership supports the 
observation made after the financial crisis that not all entities of the different countries were 
influenced in similar ways. Hence, these results imply that, whereas the relationship between 
government ownership and Z-score is robust for a normal condition of the savings banks 
market, it seems to break down when the market is distressed by a financial shock. 
 
[Insert table 6 about here] 
 
 
In the following, we present the regression results in Table 7 for six different major 
individual European countries (Austria, France, Germany, Norway, Spain, and Sweden). 
Finland was not evaluated individually, as the sample size was too small to produce 
meaningful estimates and their interpretations. If autocorrelation or heteroscedasticity was 
detected, the Newey-West estimation was applied to the sample.  
 
Starting with the Austrian savings banks (Sparkassen), it is important to note that the 
inflation rate variable was omitted from the regression because it showed signs of pairwise 
correlation with the central bank variable, causing collinearity in the data. The government 
ownership variable is not significant at any statistical level. This means that bank default 
risk in Austria is not correlated with the participation of the government in savings banks. 
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As will be shown later on, ownership is also not a deciding factor of riskiness in German 
savings banks, which is intuitive as they are almost identical in structure and organisation. 
However, two of the control variables contribute to the explanation of the Z-score. The GDP 
growth rate is significant at the 5% level, and the central bank rate is highly significant at 
the 1% level. 
[Insert table 7 about here] 
 
 
Similarly, for 40 French savings banks (Caisses d’Epargne), both government ownership 
variables are significant in explaining the variation in the Z-score at the 1% and 5% level, 
respectively. As both coefficients have a positive sign, French GOBs tend to be associated 
with higher Z-scores, therefore locating them further away from insolvency. This stands in 
accordance with the findings of the overall regression. The Z-score is also explained by the 
institution’s size. The coefficient is negative, implying that larger banks are associated with 
lower Z-scores and more risk taking. This confirms the theory that banks, which are 
sufficiently large, assume an indirect government protection due to their systemic 
importance (‘too big to fail’). 
 
The respective results for the 356 German savings banks (Sparkassen) show that the 
estimates suggest no significant relationship between bank ownership and savings banks’ 
risk taking. On the one hand, this contradicts the general belief of a moral hazard effect of 
government guarantees. On the other hand, it also contradicts empirical findings by Gropp 
et al. (2010), who found a reverse relationship upon the removal of public guarantees. 
However, it is important to note that ownership structure in general does not influence 
banks’ exposure to risk. It is the resulting change in operations that causes banks to shift 
their risk profiles. Hence, a non-significant relationship is not surprising in the context of 
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the recent financial crisis, during which German savings banks have performed better than 
their European counterparts.  
 
It can be argued that this is a result of the relatively unchanged operational structure, as 
German savings banks have maintained their traditional dual role of taking deposits and 
making loans and have not followed the stream of financial innovations. Hence, their 
conservative, old-fashioned style of banking is perceived as a very positive feature (Ayadi 
et al., 2009), which, for this sample, is not associated with ownership structure. Instead, 
other variables determine the level of riskiness of the respective savings bank, such as 
profitability, which is highly significant at the 1% level and suggests a negative relationship 
between returns and the Z-score. This implies a positive relationship between probability of 
default and returns, which stands in accordance with the results for the overall sample and 
portfolio theory. 
 
For Norway’s 114 savings banks (Sparebanken), similar to the German sample, full 
government ownership is not significant in explaining the Z-score. A possible explanation 
is that government ownership for Norwegian savings banks plays a subordinate role, as they 
were originally organised as independent institutions with a strong position in the deposits 
market (Hyttnes, 2010). However, as for France, size is highly significant and indicates 
lower Z-scores for larger savings banks. Similarly, the results for the 33 Spanish savings 
banks (Cajas de Ahorros) show that none of the coefficients is significant in explaining the 
variation in the Z-score. This could be due to two issues. First, due to consolidation in the 
Spanish savings bank sector, the number of banks available for analysis has decreased 
dramatically. Second, there were a lot of missing data for the relevant variables so that only 
a limited number of Z-scores could be calculated. Nonetheless, it can be seen that the first 
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government ownership variable (government ownership > 50 %) shows the smallest p-value 
and, as in all other countries, has a positive coefficient, therefore supporting the view that 
government-owned banks tend to operate further away from insolvency. 
 
Last, the results in Table 7 for the 60 Swedish savings banks, also called Sparebanken, show 
that the government ownership variable is significant at the 5% level and has a positive 
coefficient. Even though the dependent variable was scaled, rendering it difficult to draw 
inferences about the magnitude of the effect, it can still be inferred that the effect is strong, 
as the coefficient estimate (2.5137) is the largest of all the countries analysed. Consequently, 
Swedish government-owned savings banks operate in a less risky manner than their private 
counterparts. Additionally, the Z-score is also explained by the logarithm of total assets 
(significant at the 5% level) and ROAE (significant at the 10% level). 
 
6. Conclusion 
Whereas the theoretical literature argues that the guarantees of government-owned banks 
create incentives for banks to increase riskiness, the empirical literature has come to varying 
conclusions. Although the call for privatisation holds a prominent position in the discussion 
on regulatory strategies after the recent financial crisis, the magnitude of the crisis impact 
on European savings banks seems unrelated to their ownership structure. This ambiguity 
was the motivation for this study. Because of their importance in the European Union and 
the varying success in dealing with the recent financial crisis, the impact of different 
ownership types on the risk-taking behaviour of European savings banks was investigated 
and the individual major countries compared.  
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Employing a pooled regression with Newey-West estimators to account for autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity, data from 721 savings banks in seven European countries were 
analysed over the period 2000 to 2015. As a measure of risk, three different Z-scores were 
regressed against various exogenous variables, including a proxy for size and profitability, 
as well as dummy variables to account for the extent of governmental ownership and a set 
of control variables. In the light of the analysis carried out, the empirical estimates suggested 
a positive relationship between fully as well as partly government-owned savings banks and 
their respective Z-scores in the whole sample. The results are robust for all three variations. 
These findings contradict the general theory of moral hazard, but support the conclusions 
drawn by Ianotta et al. (2013), that GOBs have a lower default risk. On a country-level 
analysis, the same positive relationship was obtained for France and Sweden, whereas 
ownership was not significant for the individual sample of the remaining countries. Instead, 
bank profitability and size were relevant in explaining the Z-score in Germany and Norway, 
respectively.  
 
One significant implication of the above-mentioned regression results is the absence of a 
statistically significant relation between government ownership and European savings 
banks’ risk-taking behaviour during the financial crisis period compared with the normal 
period. Nationalised banks were supposed to take less risk during the crisis period in 
particular. Hence, the finding for the normal period is in line with the theory but is in fact 
opposite to the stated aim of state ownership for the crisis period. The banks in some 
countries were nationalised to reduce the risk appetite of private sector bank managers. A 
simple review of the literature on the benefits and costs of public ownership also shows 
some clear benefits of state ownership. For example, publicly owned banks’ behaviour in 
difficult economic conditions could be calmer and more appropriate. In particular, their 
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lending policy could be changed within a short period of time to reflect the prevailing market 
conditions due to the fact that the government has a significant and in some cases 
countrywide administrative network.  
 
Similarly, some authors believe that lending under public ownership would be according to 
the needs of the economy, not the needs of the banks. In a situation in which the economy 
is struggling, nationalised banks would be reluctant to take more risk, because they would 
find it much harder to turn to a source (the government) for help in difficult times than in a 
scenario of normal times. Another point worth mentioning is the fact that struggling publicly 
owned banks can be funded more quickly with larger capital under public ownership due to 
the possession of administrative control over a longer time period, thus encouraging banks 
to avoid risky business models. This would help in rebuilding the struggling banks’ 
infrastructure alongside ensuring closer regulation in future to avoid further bank failure. 
Furthermore, for public sector banks, high returns, particularly during a financial crisis and 
under difficult economic circumstances, are not a top priority; hence, in this case they are 
less likely to take excessive risk.  
 
Similarly, banks were nationalised to avoid a series of defaults by ensuring solvency besides 
filling the gaps in the kinds of credit provided by private banks and thus improving the 
allocation of resources through directed lending in some countries. State ownership is also 
expected to ensure higher competition levels, provide effective checks on monopoly powers, 
and stimulate growth due to the increase in credit availability. Balanced regional 
development and the augmentation of employment are also further justifications for the state 
ownership of banks. Despite the fact that we do not observe a clear relation between risk 
taking and government ownership, in particular during the crisis period, however, at least 
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bank managers did not increase the risk during this period. Hence, the case for the 
privatisation of these banks would still be debatable. 
 
Our employed methodology has three limitations. First, the data set used for the savings 
banks sample is based on yearly data rather than higher frequency data. As a consequence, 
the time gaps between the reported data are relatively large, which may lead to the 
negligence of intra-year effects. Second, the Z-score as a measure of default risk has the 
drawback that it is partly based on past asset returns, which may cause a misrepresentation 
of the actual solvency situation of the banks. This problem was partly solved using a more 
dynamic, time-varying Z-score, for which standard deviation and mean of the returns were 
calculated on a rolling basis, using a window width of three years. A small window width 
has the advantage that it considers fewer past values, thus basing the analysis on a more 
recent representation of the bank’s solvency situation. However, this comes with the cost 
that outliers have a bigger impact on the calculated Z-score. Therefore, when using a bigger 
window width, this outlier impact becomes smaller, but at the same time more past values 
are employed. Third, the Z-score is a measure to draw conclusions on an individual 
institution’s distance to insolvency, i.e., its default risk. It is, however, not possible to state 
any implications about the economic reasons behind the circumstances of individual 
institutions, i.e., the causes behind their operational business, because of the characteristics 
of the underlying data. 
 
Nonetheless, the inferences that can be made from these results are of relevance for future 
discussions on public banking, especially in light of the recent call for more privatisation 
within the European banking sector. Government ownership is not associated with an 
increase in savings banks’ risk of default, as GOBs tend to have higher Z-scores in the 
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underlying sample. Thus, this is clearly a counterargument for privatisation, also keeping in 
mind that many private savings banks in Europe had to be supported by government funds 
during the financial crisis. However, the empirical results also show that for some countries 
the distance to insolvency correlates with the institution’s size. This can be seen as an 
argument for regulators to closely monitor and potentially privatise large GOBs. 
 
The methodological limitations mentioned above give prospect for future research. As the 
proposed variable to measure default risk has some drawbacks, measures that even more 
accurately reflect a bank’s solvency situation could be employed. One possible alternative 
is credit ratings that overcome the problems of accounting ratios and are seen as very 
accurate relative risk measures. However, these are usually not accessible for savings banks, 
which is largely due to the fact that savings banks are rarely listed on stock exchanges. 
Hence, the construction of a credit rating system solely for savings banks could be of 
essential use to deduct more accurate and reliable empirical results. 
References 
Abdi, H. (2007) The method of least squares. In N. Salkind (Ed.) Encyclopaedia of 
Measurement and Statistics (530-532) Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
Agur, I. and Demertzis, M. (2012) Excessive Bank Risk Taking and Monetary Policy, 
(Working Paper (1457/August 2012) Frankfurt am Main: ECB. 
Agusman, A., Cullen, A. S., Gasbarro, D., Monroe, G. S. and Zumwalt, K. J. (2014) 
Government intervention, bank ownership and risk-taking during the Indonesian financial 
crisis, Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 30: 114-131. 
Albright, S., Winston, W. and Zappe, C. (2008) Data Analysis and Decision Making with 
Microsoft Excel, Revised. Mason, OH: Cengage Learning. 
30 
 
Altig, D. E. and Nosal, E. (2009) Monetary Policy in Low-Inflation Economies. New York: 
CUP. 
Altman, E. I. (1968) Financial ratios, discriminant analysis and the prediction of corporate 
bankruptcy. The Journal of Finance 23(4): 589-609.  
Altunbas, Y., Evans, L. and Molyneux, P. (2001) Bank ownership and efficiency. Journal 
of Money, Credit and Banking 33(4): 926-954.  
Ayadi, R., Schmidt, R. H. and Valverde, S. C. (2009) Investigating Diversity in the Banking 
Sector in Europe, (Report) Brussels: Center for European Policy Studies. 
Beck, T., Hesse, H., Kick, T. and von Westerhagen, N. (2009) Bank ownership and stability: 
evidence from Germany, Unpublished article. 
Berle, A. A., and Means, G C. (1968) The Modern Corporation and Private Property. (Rev. 
ed.) New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace and World. 
Bertrand, M., Duflo, E. and Mullainathan, S. (2004) How much should we trust differences-
in-differences estimates? Quarterly Journal of Economics 119(1):  249-275.  
Boyd, J. H., Graham,S. L. (1986) Risk, Regulation, and Bank Holding Company Expansion 
into Nonbanking, (Quarterly Review 10) Minneapolis: Federal Reserve Bank of 
Minneapolis. 
Brooks, C. (2014): Introductory Econometrics for Finance (3rd ed.) Cambridge: CUP. 
Bülbül, D., Schmidt, R. H. and Schüwer, U. (2013) Savings Banks and Cooperative Banks 
in Europe’, (White Paper Series (5) Frankfurt am Main: Sustainable Architecture for Finance 
in Europe (SAFE)  
Cardenas, A. (2013) The Spanish Savings Bank Crisis: History, Causes and Responses, (IN3 
Working Paper Series WP13-003) Barcelona, Universitat Oberta de Catalunya. Available 
at: http://elcrps.uoc.edu/index.php/in3-working-paper-series/article/view/1943/n13-
cardenas 
31 
 
Cordella, T. and Yeyati, E. L. (2003) Bank bailouts: moral hazard vs. value effect. Journal 
of Financial Intermediation 12(4): 300-330.  
Demsetz, R. S., Saidenberg, M. R. and Strahan, P. E. (1997) Agency Problems and Risk 
Taking at Banks, (Staff Reports, (29) New York: FED.  
Dinc, I. S. (2005) Politicians and banks: political influences on government-owned banks in 
emerging markets. Journal of Financial Economics 77(2): 453-479. 
Fernández, A. I., Fonseca, A. R. and González, F. (2006) The effect of government 
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Table 1: Construction of variables and data sources 
Series Description Source 
Total assets All positions on active side of the balance sheet summed up Bankscope 
ROAA Net profits divided by total average asset Bankscope 
ROAE Net profits divided by total average equity Bankscope 
Tier 1 ratio Core equity capital divided by total risk weighted assets. 
Core equity capital (Tier 1 capital) is the banks common 
stock plus disclosed reserves. Risk weighted assets are the 
bank’s assets weighted with the respective credit risk 
Bankscope 
Total capital ratio Tier 1 capital + Tier 2 capital divided by the banks risk 
weighted assets.  
Bankscope 
Equity/ total assets The banks total equity divided by total assets Bankscope 
Real GDP growth  Annual GDP growth rate adjusted for inflation. Bloomberg 
CPI Consumer price index considers the weighted average of a 
basket of consumer goods weighted according to their 
importance.  
Bloomberg 
Unemployment 
rate 
Harmonised unemployment rate = number of unemployed 
people as a percentage of total labour force. 
Bloomberg 
Central bank Rate Interest rate that a county’s central bank can charge when 
lending money to domestic banks 
Bloomberg 
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Table 2: BvD independence indicator classification (BvD Bankscope, 2015) 
A+ 
No shareholder with more than 25% of direct or total ownership  
(= independent companies) 
A 
A- 
B+ 
No shareholder recorded with more than 50% of direct, indirect or total ownership 
One or more shareholders recorded with more than 25% of direct or total ownership 
B 
B- 
C+ No shareholder recorded with more than 50% of direct ownership 
One shareholder recorded with more than 50% of total ownership  
(= indirectly majority owned) 
C 
D One shareholder recorded with more than 50% of direct ownership  
(= directly majority owned) 
U Unknown 
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Table 3: Durbin-Watson and Breusch-Pagan test for the whole sample of savings 
banks 
Dependent Variable Test Test statistic p-value Degrees of freedom 
𝐸𝑞𝑢𝑖𝑡𝑦
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠
 
Durbin-Watson  0.9388 0.0000 / 
Breusch-Pagan 59.7260 0.0000 8 
Total capital ratio 
Durbin-Watson  1.0044 0.0000 / 
Breusch-Pagan 30.1520 0.0002 8 
Tier 1 
Durbin-Watson  1.4607 0.0000 / 
Breusch-Pagan 25.4290 0.0013 8 
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Table 4: Coefficient test for the whole sample (Tier 1) 
Variable Estimate SE T-Value P-value 
Intercept 0.3104 0.1572 1.9750 0.0484 ** 
Total assets -0.0131 0.0082 -1.5835 0.1135 
ROAE -0.0007 0.0003 -2.2799 0.0227 ** 
Government > 50 % 0.1649 0.0585 2.8188 0.0049 *** 
Government < 50 % 0.2386 0.0784 3.0442 0.0024 *** 
GDP growth rate 1.0836 0.5244 2.0665 0.0389 ** 
Unemployment rate -1.3013 0.5492 -2.3693 0.0179 ** 
Inflation rate -2.6321 2.6301 -1.0008 0.3171 
Central bank rate -4.2709 1.2900 -3.3109 0.0009 *** 
R2 0.0210    
R2 adjusted 0.0172    
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5: Coefficient test for the whole sample (alternative definition of risk) 
 
total capital ratio 
 
equity/total assets 
Variable Estimate SE 
 
Estimate SE 
Intercept 0.3513* 0.2024 
 
0.2530 0.1565 
Total assets -0.0164 0.0107 
 
-0.0148* 0.0075 
ROAE -0.0008** 0.0004 
 
-0.0007* 0.0004 
Government > 50 % 0.1249*** 0.0428 
 
0.1117*** 0.0391 
Government < 50% 0.2309*** 0.0783 
 
0.0830** 0.0332 
GDP growth rate 0.6291 0.4379 
 
1.6647*** 0.5736 
Unemployment rate -1.2903** 0.5955 
 
-0.4764** 0.2231 
Inflation rate -0.6407 2.1054 
 
3.5254** 1.7284 
Central bank rate -4.2261*** 1.5640 
 
-6.8847 *** 2.2121 
R2 0.0152 
  
0.0125 
 
R2 adjusted 0.0127 
  
0.0123 
 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6: Coefficient test for whole sample (Tier 1) 
 2000-2007  2008-2010  2011-2015 
Variable Estimate SE  Estimate SE  Estimate SE 
Intercept 2.1383* 1.1935  0.0407 0.4739  0.2899 0.2094 
Total assets -0.1223* 0.0630  0.0073 0.0263  -0.0140 0.0116 
ROAE 0.0097* 0.0056  -0.0064 0.0099  -0.0005* 0.0002 
Government > 50 % 0.8990** 0.3915  0.1603 0.2068  0.1345* 0.0769 
Government < 50 % 0.6824* 0.3791  0.2125 0.4240  0.1391* 0.0841 
GDP growth rate -0.0030 0.0053  0.0331 0.0212  0.0025 0.0144 
Unemployment rate -0.0095 0.0254  -0.0172 0.0281  -0.0053 0.0051 
Inflation rate -0.0166 0.0231  -0.0071 0.0861  -0.0505* 0.0266 
Central bank rate 0.0337 0.0281  -0.0453 0.0820  -0.0467* 0.0266 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 7: Coefficient Test for the Z-Score Based on the Equity to Total Assets Ratio 
Variable 
 
Austria France Germany Norway Spain Sweden 
Intercept Coef. -0.4556 2.3970 1.3057** 3.6308 -0.7948 1.7805 
 
SE 1.7616 2.3256 0.6376 2.4193 2.4511 1.1144 
Total assets Coef. 0.0445 -0.1431*** -0.0263 -0.0666** -0.0284 -0.0892** 
 
SE 0.0566 0.0544 0.0417 0.0261 0.0665 0.0408 
ROAE Coef. 0.0067 -0.0080 -0.0305*** -0.0043 0.0006 0.0231* 
 
SE 0.0076 0.0062 0.0102 0.0059 0.0005 0.0132 
Government >50 % Coef. -0.0519 0.6674** 0.0771 -0.1447 1.0133 2.5137** 
 
SE 0.3224 0.2864 0.0704 0.1345 0.7579 1.2126 
Government < 50% Coef. 
 
0.3892* 
  
0.1153 
 
 
SE 
 
0.1986 
  
0.3090 
 
GDP growth rate Coef. 0.0802* -0.0052 -0.0027 0.1647*** 0.0397 -0.0179 
 
SE 0.0384 0.0488 0.0064 0.0454 0.0629 0.0193 
Unemployment rate Coef. -0.0370 0.0418 -0.1252*** -0.6786 0.0514 -0.0506 
 
SE 0.2925 0.1415 0.0471 0.5783 0.0558 0.0894 
Inflation rate Coef. 
 
0.0480 -0.0193 0.1202 0.0276 0.0516 
 
SE 
 
0.1405 0.0419 0.0627 0.0786 0.0698 
Central bank rate Coef. -0.2918*** 0.0029 -0.0065 -0.2245 0.1218 -0.0217 
 
SE 0.0673 0.1177 0.0243 0.1895 0.2289 0.0635 
Notes: ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
